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Lindsey Thomas ‘08 
 
Social Sciences Research Fellowship 
 
 
The aim of this paper is provide an investigation into the effect of competition policy on industrial 
performance.  The impetus for this research project was a British economy class taken on the 
London Economics Study Group in spring 2007. 
 
I. Introduction 
  
In many of the readings and 
complementary lectures for the course the 
British Professors and scholars continuously 
held that the recent revival of the British 
economy was linked to changes in 
competition policy.  These changes included 
the deregulation actions taken under 
Margaret Thatcher’s 1980s administration 
and continued under successive 
governments.  The goal of this study is to 
analyze this claim to see if it can be 
supported empirically.  In addition, the 
paper will provide a detailed comparison of 
the United Kingdom’s economy to the 
United States’ economy to see the role, if 
any, played by differing competition policies 
in the performance of several selected 
industries.  
 There are strong theoretical reasons 
in economics for linking competition policy 
to industrial performance.  In this context, 
competition policy refers to the extent to 
which governments can encourage free 
market competition in an attempt to bring 
about a more efficient allocation of 
resources. Obstacles to free market 
competition include government regulation 
and nationalization, labor market rigidities, 
government support for cartels and 
interference in free trade.  Economists 
measure industrial performance in a number 
of ways including profits, costs, productivity 
and technological advance.  Moreover, 
industrial performance is linked with many 
structural variables such as economies of 
scale, market concentration, product 
differentiation, advertising, vertical 
integration and competition policy.1  
Theoretically, the degree to which firms are 
able to compete with one another is a major 
determinant of the extent to which they can 
impact price, earn profits and innovate.   
 Basic principles of economics hold 
that increased competition will have a 
positive effect on industrial performance.  
Increased competition is generally linked to 
higher levels of productivity, lower prices, 
increased innovation and more product 
differentiation.  The economics behind this 
maintains that in order for firms to compete 
with one another they must be efficient so 
they are not driven out of the market.  This 
efficiency usually lends itself to higher 
productivity, lower costs, and consequently 
lower prices; all of which benefit consumers 
                                                
1 Shepherd, William G, Causes of Increased 
Competition in the US Economy, 1939-1980. Review 
ofEconomics and Statistics, Vol. 64, No. 4. (Nov., 
1982), pp. 613-626 
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and increase social welfare.  Moreover, 
firms also compete with one another by 
diversifying and filling market niches, which 
result in product differentiation and 
increased consumer choice; these are 
additional potential benefits for society.  
Industrial performance, which as mentioned 
above can be measured in a myriad of ways, 
is improved by higher levels of competition 
because firms are operating more efficiently 
with lower costs, higher productivity and 
normal profits.  
 This paper, grounded in the 
theoretical background above, uses the work 
done by William G. Shepherd in his seminal 
1982 study “Causes of Increased 
Competition in the US Economy 1939-
1980” as a starting point to compare the 
competition policies in the UK and the US 
for the airlines, telecommunications, 
railways, and coal industries.  As will be 
discussed in more detail later, Shepherd’s 
research involved categorizing the post-
deregulation level of competition in the 
specified industries, and then determining 
the factors that led to new competition.  This 
study, in contrast, will function as a 
comparison between the US and the UK, 
comparing not only the different 
competition policies employed, but also 
whether the resulting industrial 
performances were similar.  Primarily, it 
will be looking to explore, and provide 
evidence concerning the hypothesis that 
policies that promote increased competition 
have a significant impact on industrial 
performance.  
 As noted above the catalyst for 
conducting this empirical study was the 
claim made by several British economists of 
the large impact of deregulation on 
industrial performance and how the 
aggregate effect of this was related to 
Britain’s economic revival.  The decision to 
contrast the UK with the US, however, was 
made for several reasons.  The UK and the 
US not only had varying degrees of 
regulation for the four selected industries, 
but the two countries also took very 
different approaches to deregulation.  The 
four industries covered in this study were 
also chosen for specific reasons.  Airlines 
historically had a very different industry 
structure in the UK and in the US with the 
UK having one large airline, even post-
deregulation, and the US market being 
characterized by several large airlines.  
Moreover, both the British and American 
markets were affected by the entry of Low 
Cost Carriers (LCCs) in the late 20th century 
so it is interesting to see how this impacted 
industrial structure and performance in each 
country.  Telecommunications was an 
industry in which the UK and the US had 
similar market structures, but contrasting 
approaches to both regulation and 
deregulation; thus, an examination of the 
performance and structure outcomes is 
worthwhile.  The railway industry was 
handled very differently in the US and the 
UK.  The UK’s industry was more regulated 
than the US’s, but their privatization 
approach was more extreme and became 
quite controversial.  Thus, it will be 
interesting to analyze which approach led to 
better industrial performance.  Coal, the 
final industry to be explored, was chosen 
because it was only a regulated industry in 
the UK and never nationally run in the US.  
As such, it provides an opportunity for 
comparison of industrial performance in an 
industry untouched by government in the 
US, and regulated and then deregulated in 
the UK.  Overall, the selected industries 
provide for a wide range of comparisons 
between the UK and the US leading to an 
informed conclusion. 
 This paper consists of several 
sections.  First there will be an explanation 
of Shepherd’s 1982 analyses and a 
discussion of his methodology that will be 
applied later in this work.  Secondly, there 
2
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will be a detailed historical analysis of the 
UK’s experience in competition policy and 
the resulting industrial performance for the 
four selected industries, which will be 
followed by a similar discussion for the US.  
This will allow for significant comparisons 
and contrasts to be made about the two 
countries and their experiences with 
deregulation.  The last section will utilize 
the empirical data analyzed and draw a 
conclusion about the relationship between 
industrial performance and competition 
policy for the specific industries examined.  
 
II. Shepherd 
  
In his 1982 study Shepherd looked at 
why competition increased in the American 
economy during the four decades from 1939 
to 1980.  He concluded that antitrust policies 
were the main reason for increased 
competition.  Shepherd also considered 
deregulation and import competition, in 
addition to antitrust policies, as possible 
causes of a higher level of competition.  
Moreover he noted in his work that 
transportation and telecommunications were 
influenced by both antitrust and 
deregulation.  Shepherd constructed a model 
that estimated the amount of competition in 
a given industry by using both structural and 
behavioral evidence to assign markets into 
one of four specific categories.  Shepherd 
placed each selected industry into four 
classes of structure: pure monopoly, 
dominant firm, tight oligopoly, or effective 
competition (catchall category for remaining 
market structures).   
 The categories he constructed had 
very specific criteria.  In order to be 
classified as “pure monopoly” a single 
firm’s market share in the industry had to be 
near or at 100 percent, the firm must be able 
to effectively blockade entry and have 
monopoly control over the level and 
structure of prices.  For the “dominant firm” 
category the single firm must have a market 
share between 50-90 percent with no close 
rivals be able to keep entry barriers high, 
have price control ability, the ability to 
influence innovation and earn high returns.  
For a market to be classified as a “tight 
oligopoly” the four-firm concentration ratio 
would need to be above 60 percent with 
stable market shares, the industry must have 
medium to high entry barriers, and there 
must be rigid prices present, indicating 
cooperation among firms.  The final 
category “effective competition” had the 
characteristics of a four-firm concentration 
ratio below 60 percent, unstable market 
shares, flexible pricing, low entry barriers, 
little collusion and low profits.2  Shepherd’s 
categories will be discussed and applied 
later in this paper, and used in drawing 
conclusion based on the empirical evidence 
gathered. 
 
III. The UK: Airlines 
  
The UK’s experience with 
government regulation of industry gained 
momentum after World War II.  During 
these years many industries were 
nationalized as the state increased its role in 
the economy.  The airline industry, during 
the mid to late 20th century was composed of 
large state-run airlines, with only a 
sprinkling of less-successful private airlines, 
which mainly served small, charter routes 
(like British United Airways during the 
1960s).  The major player in the UK 
commercial airline industry was British 
Airways (BA).  BA was formed by the 
merger of the two state-owned airlines 
British European Airways and British 
Overseas Corporation Airways in 1972.  
During the 1970s and early 1980s the only 
                                                
2 Shepherd, William G. Causes of Increased 
Competition in the US Economy, 1939-1980. Review 
ofEconomics and Statistics, Vol. 64, No. 4. (Nov., 
1982), pp. 613-626 
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rival was the also state-owned British 
Caledonian (BCal), which the government 
created in an attempt to introduce 
competition into the industry.  However, 
despite the state’s efforts, BA continued to 
dominate the industry throughout the 1980s. 
 Government deregulation of the 
airline industry occurred in 1987 with a 
public flotation of BA’s shares.  The newly 
privatized BA, however, continued to 
control the market and soon acquired BCal, 
which foiled the government’s attempts to 
introduce competition.  Similarly, BA went 
on to take over TAT European, Deutsche 
BA and Qantas.3  Initially after privatization, 
the number of airlines in the UK industry 
increased, but over time many of the new 
operations were unprofitable and were 
driven out, like BCal.  Over the years, and 
still today, BA continues to be the major 
player in the UK airline industry. 
 The current market structure of the 
industry, 20 years after deregulation, 
consists of BA holding dominant firm status.  
This is clearly reflected in data from the 
Civil Aviation Authority for 2005-2006 
which shows BA with a market share of 
45.8 percent (measured as percentage of all 
available tonne kilometers) with Virgin 
Atlantic as the closest rival, holding a 14.5 
percent share.4  This market structure, 
however, is more competitive than in the 
mid to late 20th century when BA had a 
virtual monopoly.  It is also an improvement 
from the 1995-1996 Civil Aviation 
Authority statistics which had BA with 58.7 
percent of the market and Virgin Atlantic 
with only 9.8percent.5  Moreover, BA also 
                                                
3 Yarrow, George, “Airline Deregulation and 
Privatization in the UK,” Regulatory Policy Research 
Centre, Hertford College, Oxford. 1996. < 
http://www.esri.go.jp/jp/archive/bun/bun150/bun144a
- e.pdf> 
4 “UK Airline Statistics,” Civil Aviation Authority.< 
http://www.caa.co.uk/default.aspx?catid=80&  
pagetype=88&pageid=1&sglid=1> 
5 Ibid 
faces more competition when you consider 
that in the airline industry a “market” is 
actually a city-pair.  In this sense, BA has a 
lot more competition than previously as both 
Virgin Atlantic and easyJet fly the many of 
the same routes as BA.  Another significant 
change in the market structure of the 
industry post-deregulation has been the 
entrance of Low Cost Carriers (LCCs). In 
1985 Ryan Air an Irish-owned airlines, 
established itself in the UK with a UK-
Ireland route.  Ryan Air and its successors 
were based on a low cost model developed 
by Southwest in the US.  Southwest’s LCC 
model consisted of low fares, high 
frequency flights, point to point service, no 
free meals or drinks, no seat assignments, 
short flights, and flights to secondary 
airports.6  The other successful low-cost 
carrier in the UK, easyJet, entered the 
market in 1995.  For each success of an LCC 
however, the UK also saw many failures, 
like Debonair and Buzz.7   
 The LCCs created a new market for 
airline travel.  The low-cost airlines did not 
seek to compete in the long haul market and 
instead targeted customers whose main 
travel concern was economic, and would 
only fly if it was cost-effective.  Ryan Air, 
for instance, seeks to capture only the low-
cost market and has lower quality of service 
with only the bare essentials on their flights.  
easyJet, in contrast, found a market-niche by 
using an intermediate strategy, providing 
low-cost fares, but also flying into major 
airports and having better customer service.8  
easyJet’s strategy is more of a threat to 
established carriers because it is directly 
challenging their market.  The response of 
the incumbents to LCC entry was not to try 
                                                
6 Smith, Simon. “The Strategies and Effects of Low-
Cost Airlines,” PPT. <www.icea.co.uk/archive/low 
percent20costpercent20strategypercent20040405.ppt
> 
7 Ibid 
8 Ibid 
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and replicate the low-cost market, but 
instead BA’s response was to promote short 
haul flight routes with a “price and value” 
slogan, attempting to differentiate with good 
service.9  Overall, the largest change to the 
UK airline industry has been the entrance of 
LCCs, and although the industry is slightly 
more competitive BA continues to dominate 
with Virgin Atlantic holding the number two 
spot.  
 In addition to the change in 
competition policy leading to more 
competition within the industry, 
privatization also had positive industrial 
performance effects.  Studies show that 
efficiency gains led to an almost 15 percent 
decrease in BA’s fares post-privatization.10  
These efficiency gains were mainly 
attributed to changes in managerial pay with 
the introduction of a new executive share 
option scheme and a large increase in the 
chairman’s salary.  Moreover, a privatized 
BA has also seen a longer-term 
improvement in unit cost performance 
which is evidenced by a visible decrease in 
revenue per RPM (revenue passenger miles) 
and cost per RPM, which confirms the 
company is operating more cost 
effectively.11  Moreover, BA was also 
financially strong during the 1990s with 
increasing positive profit even while its 
market share was falling which indicates 
efficiency and productivity gains.  
Deregulation provided the atmosphere for 
new competitors to enter and succeed 
including Virgin Atlantic and the two main 
LCCs Ryan Air and easyJet.  The change in 
competition policy, the privatization of BA, 
opened up the market to more competition 
than was present before.  More significantly, 
                                                
9 Ibid 
10 Eckel, Catherine, Eckel, Doug and Singal Vinjay, 
“Privatization and efficiency: Industry effects of the 
sale of British Airways,” Journal of Financial 
Economics 43 (1997) 275-298, 276-277 
11 Ibid, 275 
it also led to a stronger, more efficient 
performance by BA as evidenced by lower 
prices combined with continued profitability 
and an improved cost performance.  
 
IV. The UK: Telecommunications 
  
Similar to the airline industry, 
telecommunications in the UK also began as 
a state-run enterprise.  Since its advent, 
telecommunications was part of the General 
Post Office, a nationalized industry.  In 1981 
Post Office Communications was renamed 
British Telecom.  In 1981, BT’s monopoly 
in telecom ended when the government 
granted an operating license to newly-
privatized Mercury Communications.  
Mercury became Cable and Wireless in 
1997, and eventually part of National 
Telecommunications Limited (NTL), which 
later merged with Virgin Mobile and 
Telewest in 2006 to create Virgin Media.  
The 1980s telecom market structure 
consisted of a duopoly between BT and 
Mercury.   
 In 1984 the Telecommunications Act 
eliminated BT’s exclusive rights to provide 
services.  BT was also privatized in 1984, 
with the initial selling of 50 percent of its 
shares to the public, and the remaining 
shares in 1991 and 1993.  Some regulation 
of the industry persisted, however, with the 
government instituting price cap, which 
remained until 2006, in an attempt to curb 
BT’s market power.  Several elements of the 
UK’s telecom deregulation approach are 
interesting to note.  The UK did not required 
BT to interconnect with all service providers 
and instead promoted the construction of 
alternative networks to compete against each 
other.  Further, “equal access” (ability for 
users to select a long distance provider 
without dialing extra digits) was not 
mandated.  The UK allowed “unbundling” 
(providers able to compete for retail 
distribution and use networks elements in a 
5
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“piecemeal” fashion), and encouraged 
“facilities based competition,” which meant 
firms could succeed only by being efficient 
(in contrast to the US which allowed 
competition based on residual pricing).12   
 More deregulation continued to 
emerge over time.  During the 1990s, the 
market opened up even further and new 
Public Telecommunications Operators were 
given licenses.  In 2003, the 
Communications Act further updated the 
market with the granting of licenses being 
eliminated in favor of any company being 
“generally authorized” to provide 
telecommunications services.  This decree 
held so long as the provider met 21 general 
conditions of entitlement that laid out their 
responsibilities as a telecommunications 
operator.13 Additionally, in recent years the 
market for wireless telephone service has 
grown rapidly.  This has led to the entrance 
of new telecom firms that provide mobile 
phone service, some British and other 
foreign-controlled, into the UK market. 
 Changes in competition policy begun 
during the 1980s had an effect on market 
structure and concentration in 
telecommunications.  Where previously BT 
had a virtual monopoly in telephone services 
now other providers are present.  Although, 
BT still retains a dominant position, there is 
more competition than before.  Market share 
data from the Office of Telecommunications 
(OFTEL, now OFCOM) for 2002-2003, 
measuring all calls from fixed lines, gives 
BT 71 percent, NTL-Telewest 21.1 percent, 
Cable and Wireless 2 percent, Kingston 0.5 
                                                
12 Green, James R. and Teece, David J, “Four 
Approaches to Telecommunications Deregulation 
and Competition: The US, UK, Australia and New 
Zealand,” (1998) 
<http://imio.haas.berkeley.edu/crtp/publications/work
ingpapers/wp49.PDF?> 
13 “General Conditions of Entitlement,” Office of 
Communications, <http://www.ofcom.org.uk/telecom 
s/ ioi/g_a_regime/gce/gcoe/> 
percent and Others 14.5 percent.14  For the 
mobile phone market, competition is a bit 
more balanced with Orange, Vodaphone, O2 
and T-Mobile all holding almost equal 
market shares.  Basically the fixed line 
telephone market is more competitive than 
under state-ownership but still dominated by 
a single firm; however, the mobile telephone 
market is what Shepherd terms a “tight 
oligopoly.”  
 Although the UK telecom market is 
not as competitive as it could be, large gains 
in industrial performance have been made.  
According to Parker (1994), labor 
productivity has grown much faster since 
privatization, although total factor 
productivity levels have grown less.15  
Parker also notes that employment costs 
declined and R+D expenditure fell as a 
percentage of turnover, which reflects a 
more efficient use of resources.  However, 
in contrast, the price caps placed on BT did 
not allow it to be as efficient and productive 
as may have been possible with no 
constraints.   
 In conclusion, the privatization of 
BT and opening up of the market to new 
telecom operators injected some competition 
into telecommunications in the UK  This 
resulted in a slightly more competitive 
structure than before but still no firm to rival 
BT’s dominance.  Moreover, the explosion 
of the wireless market led firms to enter 
there and currently an oligopolistic 
concentration persists.  However, the end of 
regulation and state-control led to visible 
increases in BT’s productivity even in the 
face of price caps.  The end of price caps, as 
of 2006, may lead to even more productivity 
and efficiency increases in the near future.  
                                                
14 Competition in the UK Telecommunications 
Market,” CWU Research, <http://www.oftel.org/) 
15 Parker, David. “The UK’s Privatisation 
Experiment: The Passage of Time Permits a Sober 
Assessment,” CESIFO Working Paper No. 1126, 
1994. 
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V. The UK: Railways 
  
Like airlines and 
telecommunications, railways in the UK 
began a government enterprise.  In 1948 the 
four largest state-owned railroads became 
British Rail.  British Rail’s financial history 
is mixed, with losses in the 1950s followed 
by reorganization and profitability in the 
1960s.  During the 1980s the government, in 
the run-up to deregulation, cut funding and 
forced British Rail to become more cost 
effective.  In 1987 the railways were 
privatized under a plan constructed by the 
Adam Smith Institute.  The proposed 
method called for “vertical separation” in 
which a separate company would manage 
the railroad infrastructure, Railtrack (later, 
Network Rail).  The privatization plan also 
broke British Rail into 25 different 
passenger operation companies, three 
companies who leased rolling stock and 
many different rail maintenance 
companies.16  The UK’s vertical separation 
of the railroads went the farthest, in terms of 
private control, of any railway deregulation 
in the world. 
 For all of the UK’s railway 
privatization failures, the approach did result 
in competition among train operators.  
Currently there are 21 passenger operators 
and four train operators in the UK17  In this 
respect a pretty competitive structure does 
exist in the market with several train 
operators competing per route.  However, in 
contrast, after the Railtrack’s collapse in 
2000 the infrastructure company was taken 
over by Network Rail.  This is not a public 
                                                
16 Hilmola, Olli-Pekka and Szekely, Bulcsu, 
“Deregulation of Railroads and Future Development 
Scenarios in Europe- Literature Analysis of 
Privatization Process Taken Place in US, UK and 
Sweden. 2006, 15 
17 “Network Rail,” 
http://www.networkrail.co.uk/aspx/2369.aspx 
company and is run by committee monitored 
by the Office of Rail Regulation.  Many 
investors and economists refer to this as the 
“re-nationalization of the railways” since 
Network rail is a quasi-governmental 
company with no public shares.18  
Additionally, in 2003 Network Rail took 
overall maintenance from private 
companies.19  Thus, although the market is 
mainly competitive there has been a 
reinstitution of government control in the 
UK railroad industry in recent years.  
 Due to the controversy surrounding 
railroad privatization it is difficult to 
measure to what extent competition policy 
had an effect on industrial performance.  
Clearly, the 2000 bankruptcy and collapse of 
the private, infrastructure company Railtrack 
was not good for the industry.  However, in 
recent years the performance of Network 
Rail has been more financially sound.  The 
most recent data from Network Rail’s 
Annual Reports and Accounts for 2006 
show a £74 million reduction in operating 
costs, and an increase in operation profit 
from 2005 to 2006.20  Also a report from the 
Association of Train Operating Companies 
(ATOC) holds that passenger levels are 23 
percent higher post-privatization.21  For 
2005, the ATOC reported passengers would 
take 1.07 billion railway journeys, the 
highest amount since 1958.22  Overall, the 
                                                
18 “German Bank May Invest in Rails,” New York 
Times, 13 October 2001. < 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst 
/fullpage.html?res=9500E5D9133FF930A25753C1A
9679C8B63> 
19 “Network Rail: Our History,” 
<http://www.networkrail.co.uk/aspx/729.aspx> 
20 “Network Rail: Our Track Record” < 
http://www.networkrail.co.uk/aspx/699.aspx> 
21 Hilmola, Olli-Pekka and Szekely, Bulcsu, 18 
22 “Rail travel rises to highest level since 1958,” The 
Guardian, 30 December 2005.  
< 
http://business.guardian.co.uk/story/0,16781,1675086
,00.html> 
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most recent data suggest the railway 
industry is thriving and has begun to recover 
from its few difficult years directly 
following privatization. 
 In sum, competition policy changes 
clearly affected market structure with 
numerous new train operators, for both 
passenger and freight operations, emerging.  
In this context, deregulation has produced 
significant competition.  However, the 
privatization process was also partially 
reversed with the government regaining 
control of the infrastructure and continuing 
to operate the company.  That being said, the 
current performance of Network Rail has 
been strong so it is difficult to conclude that 
the quasi re-nationalization was not the best 
move for the industry.  
 
VI. The UK: Coal 
  
Like the previous mentioned 
industries, coal in the UK was also a 
nationalized industry.  In 1946 the Coal 
Nationalization Act was passed which 
created British Coal.  The historical legacy 
of the coal mining industry in Britain is one 
of great strife with a legacy of unions and 
labor strikes.  During the 1980s, however, 
Margaret Thatcher took the life out of the 
coal mining union, once the most powerful 
union in the country.  In the run-up to 
privatization, the government closed a lot of 
coal mines, more than 27 collieries in total.23  
The mines were closed because coal 
production output had to be reduced as it 
had been replaced by cheaper energy 
imports like natural gas.  Since the 
privatization of the power industry in 1990 
cheap, gas-supplied electricity generators 
have replaced coal as fuel.  The Coal 
Industry Act of 1994 privatized British Coal; 
                                                
23 Owens, Geoffrey. From Empire to Europe: The 
Decline and Revival of British Industry Since the 
Second World War. London: HarperCollins 
Publishers. 1999 
bids were invited to acquire the mining 
company in January 1996.  Although bids 
were accepted from various independent 
companies, all the major regional packages 
(central north, central south and northeast 
England) came under control of RJB Mining 
(renamed UK Coal in 2001).    
Although changes in competition 
policy did not really impact the structure of 
the UK coal industry, it is much more 
competitive than prior to deregulation.  UK 
Coal is by the far largest coal mining 
company in the UK, mining more than 60 
percent of the UK’s coal and providing 7 
percent of its electricity.24  However, the 
coal industry is much smaller than it once 
was and most of the competition UK Coal 
faces is from imported coal and natural gas.  
During the privatization process it is clear 
the impending change in competition policy 
had an effect on industrial performance.  
This is evidenced by a measured increase in 
labor productivity in a study done by David 
Parry, David Waddington and Chas Critcher 
(1997).25  Recently, as of 2004, UK Coal’s 
managing director reported the company is 
producing at its lowest cost ever.26  While 
this is a significant measure of industrial 
performance strength it cannot only be 
attributed to privatization, but to the high 
levels of import competition the industry is 
facing as well.   
 In sum, the UK coal industry today is 
very different than when it was a 
nationalized industry.  It is much smaller 
and less coal is being produced domestically 
than before privatization.  Although, it is 
similar in that one UK firm dominates the 
                                                
24 “About UK Coal,” <http://www.ukcoal.com/> 
25 Parry David, Waddington, David and Critcher, 
Chas (1997), “Industrial Relations in the Privatized 
Mining Industry,” British Journal of Industry 
Relations 35 (2), 173-196 
26 Pym, Hugh, “Can the UK Coal Industry Survive?” 
BBC, 4 March 2004 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/business/3534519.stm> 
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domestic industry and only faces 
competition from abroad.  However, since 
UK Coal only supplies 7 percent of the 
country’s electricity, it does not have the 
amount of market power it did years ago.  
This is primarily a result of significant 
changes in the energy market that have 
reduced the demand for coal.  Even so the 
industry is still alive, and UK coal continues 
to be a productive and efficient company.  
 
VII. The US: Airlines 
  
After discussing the UK’s experience 
with regulation and deregulation in the four 
selected industries we now turn our attention 
to the US’s deregulation process in order to 
draw comparisons.  Unlike the UK’s state-
owned airlines, the US had a system for 
regulating the private airlines.  From 1938 to 
1978 the Civil Aviation Board (CAB) was 
responsible for regulating the airlines as a 
public utility.  CAB had the power to set 
fares, routes and schedules.  This system did 
not allow for the airlines to compete directly 
with one another, or operate productively 
and efficiently.  Federal control over the 
airlines came to an end with the Airline 
Deregulation Act of 1978, which was the 
first instance of breaking up a government 
enterprise since 1934.  The legislation 
eliminated the constraints on airlines.  This 
allowed for airlines to set their prices and fly 
wherever they chose, which would allow 
them to minimize costs and operate more 
efficiently. 
 The period following deregulation 
was marked by airline failure and 
consolidation within the industry.  The 
immediate aftermath of 1978 saw the 
entrance of many new airlines, but many 
were inefficient and over a hundred were 
eventually driven out.  In 1985 there were 
twenty major airlines and within two and a 
half years over half of them disappeared, 
most by merger, including: AirCal, Ozark, 
Piedmont, PSA, Republic and Western.  
Moreover, between 1976 and mid 2001, 
over nine major carriers either went 
bankrupt or were liquidated including: 
Eastern, Midway, Braniff, PanAm, 
Continental, America West and TWA.27  
Many of the bankrupt airlines, instead of 
leaving the market, merged with others in an 
attempt to regain financial stability; others 
merged to increase their market power.  
Examples of mergers include TWA with 
American in 2001 and America West with 
US Airways in 2005. The result of so many 
failures and takeovers is American, Delta, 
Northwest and other major airlines, 
increasing their market power.   
 Another important development in 
the US airline industry is the entrance of 
LCCs.  Southwest, the airline that began the 
low-cost model, entered the US market in 
1971.  Southwest’s entrance and profitability 
with low fares was a major impetus for 
airline deregulation.  Southwest’s model has 
been replicated by others, most successfully 
by Jet Blue in the US market.  As mentioned 
previously, Southwest’s strategy was also 
modeled in the UK by easyJet and Ryan Air.  
The response by the incumbent carriers in 
the US to LCC entry was much different 
than that seen in the UK.  The large carriers 
responded by attempting to compete in the 
market and failing.  United Airlines tried to 
enter the low-cost market by starting the 
LCC “Ted,” and Delta also attempted with 
“Delta Song.”  A study by Steve Morrison 
examines the actual, adjacent and potential 
competition Southwest created, not only 
through its own fares but with its effect on 
competitors as well.  He measures the 
aggregate impact of lower fares to be $12.9 
billion in benefits to consumers in 1998 
                                                
27 Kahn, Alfred E. “Airline Deregulation,” The 
Concise Encyclopedia of Economics,< 
http://www.econlib.  org /LIBRARY/ 
Enc/AirlineDeregulation.html> 
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alone.28  Given this empirical estimate it is 
clear Southwest created a lot of competition 
in the airline industry and led to fares being 
significantly lower than they otherwise 
would have been. 
 Although recent consolidation has 
had the effect of reducing the national level 
of competition, on most major routes 
competition still exists because it is the 
concentration level on individual routes that 
matters.  Post-deregulation there has been a 
25 percent increase in the average number of 
airlines per route.  For example, in 1992 six 
airlines carried the route from Boston to 
Phoenix, compared to only two in 1977.29  
Currently, market share in the US is divided 
between several large airlines.  Airline 
market share, measured in domestic revenue 
passenger miles, for March 2006 to 
February 2007 reports American at 15.4 
percent, United 12.1 percent, Southwest 
11.9 percent, Delta 11.2 percent, Continental 
7.7 percent, Northwest 7.0 percent, US 
Airways 4.7 percent and Jet Blue 4.0 
percent.30  From this data it is clear there is 
currently competition in the industry on 
many different routes, which was not 
present before deregulation.  However, there 
has been recent talk of possible future airline 
mergers including US Airways taking over 
Delta, a possible United and Northwest 
merger, and a potential Continental-United 
merger.31 
                                                
28 Morrison, Steven A. “Actual, Adjacent and 
Potential Competition: Measuring the Full Effect of 
Southwest Airlines,” Journal of Transport 
Economics and Policy, Vol. 35, Part 2, May 2001,pp. 
239-256, 239 
29 Kahn, Alfred E. “Airline Deregulation,” The 
Concise Encyclopedia of Economics,< 
http://www.econlib.  org /LIBRARY/ 
Enc/AirlineDeregulation.html> 
30 “Bureau of Transportation Statistics,” 
<http://www.transtats.bts.gov/> 
31 Grossman, David, “Airlines mergers: Déjà vu all 
over again?” USA Today, 18 December 2006, 
<http://www.usatoday.com/travel/columnist/grossma
n/2006-12-17-airline-mergers_x.htm> 
 Not only has deregulation impacted 
the structure of the airline industry, it has 
also had significant effects on industrial 
performance.  In terms of fares, between 
1976 and 1990 passenger fares (measured as 
average yields per passenger) declined 30 
percent and 10-18 percent of this is 
attributed solely to deregulation.32  The 
primary cause of this is the presence of price 
competition among airlines, leading to 
deeply discounted fares.  An increase in 
productivity was also measured because 
restrictions have been removed and airlines 
could operate to minimize costs.  Moreover, 
airlines have also seen an increase in 
occupancy rates, with a rise to 61 percent 
post-deregulation, compared to 52.6 percent 
before.33  Moreover, efficiency was also 
increased by the move to the “hub and spoke 
system” that occurred after deregulation.  
This system consists of airlines routing their 
flights through several hub cities.  This 
allowed for the airlines’ equipment to fully 
adapt to the routes in that small prop jets 
were used for short hauls and jets for longer 
flights.  This resulted in a more efficient 
allocation of resources.   
 In sum, it is clear that deregulation 
changed both the market structure and more 
significantly, the industrial performance of 
the airline industry.  Although there were 
quite a few post-deregulation mergers, as 
evidenced by current market share data the 
airline industry in the US is still pretty 
competitive.  Moreover, the entrance of 
LCCs like Southwest and Jet Blue forced the 
incumbent carriers to lower fares in order to 
compete, creating significant consumer 
welfare gains.  Furthermore, the post-
deregulation efficiency gains, through fares, 
cost reductions and resource allocation, 
                                                
32 Kahn, Alfred E. “Airline Deregulation,” The 
Concise Encyclopedia of Economics,< 
http://www.econlib.  org /LIBRARY/ 
Enc/AirlineDeregulation.html> 
33 Ibid 
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indicated a much stronger industrial 
performance.  In contrast to the UK, it is 
clear the American airline market is still a 
bit more competitive competitive, although 
similar gains in performance have been 
observed.  This conclusion suggests that 
changes in competition policy are linked 
with positive changes in industrial 
performance. 
 
VII. The US: Telecommunications 
  
Unlike the airline industry, the 
telecommunications industry in the US was 
a regulated national monopoly prior to its 
break-up and deregulation.  The first 
telephone company was Bell Telephone 
Company, renamed American Bell and then 
later, when creating its long distance 
telephone network in the late 19th century, 
changed its name to American Telephone 
and Telegraph (AT&T).  AT&T gained 
monopoly status with government help after 
the Kingsbury Commitment of 1913.  This 
agreement between A&T and the 
government allowed AT&T to buy as many 
competitors as it wished as long as it sold an 
equal amount.  This resulted in AT&T 
gaining control in specific geographic areas 
while selling its less desirable companies.  
The commitment also mandated that AT&T 
provide long distance service to independent 
exchanges.34  During this period AT&T 
retained market control with its “Bell 
system” which consisted of twenty two Bell 
Operating Companies and Western Electric, 
with AT&T as the parent company.  Owning 
Western Electric, a telephone manufacturer, 
allowed AT&T to force customers into 
single telephone service.  Under the 
Communications Act of 1934 the 
government established the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) to 
regulate the telephone industry.  Under this 
                                                
34“Bell System Memorial Home Page,” 
<http://www.porticus.org/bell/bell.htm> 
legislation, large telephone companies 
(AT&T) had to provide universal access to 
all citizens, which was done by pricing local 
residential service at below cost and 
subsidizing it with other network services.  
 During the 1960s and 1970s AT&T’s 
monopoly status began to wane.  Both the 
Hush-a-phone (1956) and Carterphone 
(1968) cases were instrumental in this 
because AT&T was forced by the FCC to 
allow interconnection to their phones from 
an outside company.  Additionally, during 
this time the rise of cheap microwave 
equipment occurred, which allowed 
competitors to create long distance networks 
at a lower cost than before.  This led to the 
success of Microwave Communications 
(MCI) in selling telecom services to large 
businesses.  The 1970s was also the 
beginning of long distance competition due 
to asymmetric price regulation.  AT&T, as 
previously mentioned, was mandated to 
subsidize local service; MCI, in contrast, 
was allowed to offer long distance service 
without providing local service.  This 
system created competition but not merit 
competition.35  Moreover, this asymmetry 
continued even post-deregulation with the 
FCC imposing price caps on AT&T. 
 In 1984 the US Department of 
Justice carried out a 1981 consent decree in 
an antitrust suit against AT&T that led to 
AT&T’s break-up.  AT&T’s local services 
were split into seven independent regional 
operating companies, the “Baby Bells,” and 
in return AT&T was allowed to enter the 
internet market.36  In 1984 the Bells were 
Ameritech (acquired by SBC in 1999), Bell 
Atlantic (acquired by GTE in 2000, became 
Verizon), Bell South (acquired by at&t in 
2006), NYNEX (acquired by Bell Atlantic 
in 1996), Pacific Telesis (acquired by SBC 
                                                
35 Green and Teece, 25-27 
36 “History: AT&T antitrust,” 
<http://www.cybertelecom.org/notes/att_antitrust.htm
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in 1997), Southwest Bell (1995 became 
SBC, acquired by AT&T in 2005 and 
changed name to at&t) and US West 
(acquired by Qwest in 2000).  The next 
legislative development in the US telecom 
industry came in 1996 with the Federal 
Communications Act, replacing the 1934 
Act.  Here, the Federal Government 
attempted to create competition by forcing 
the Bells to open up local telephone 
networks to other companies.  The idea was 
that once “effective competition” was 
present there the Bells could expand into 
other telecom markets.37   
 Since the US’s approach to 
telecommunications deregulation was very 
different from the process done in the UK, it 
is interesting to contrast the effects on 
market structure.  In regard to local service 
distribution, the Baby Bells operated as 
natural, regional monopolies, which was 
accepted by the government until 1996.  The 
new components of deregulation were clear 
attempts to inject competition into the local 
service market.  The government stressed 
providers competing in the retail distribution 
of networks services.  This meant 
“unbundling” at every possible stage so that 
companies would be able to build networks 
with very little investment, which would 
promote competition.  Interconnection 
between service local and long distance 
service providers was also mandated to 
allow for network building.  Deregulation 
also allowed for resale or competitors 
“reselling” the incumbent provider’s local 
services and then instituting their own.38  
This method helped MCI and Sprint to enter 
the local market.  Thus, although the US 
system ended up bringing greater 
competition to the local market it was not 
based on efficient companies gaining power, 
                                                
37 “Telecommunications and Federal Deregulation,” 
<http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/rhodesprp 
/01_02/divide/dereg.htm> 
38 Green and Teece, 28-32 
but residual pricing and therefore not merit-
based competition.  The UK, in contrast, 
promoted competitors building alternative 
networks which would only succeed if cost 
effective.   
 Similar to local service, the long 
distance market was also opened up as a 
result of deregulation.  The US required 
“equal access” which allowed users to select 
a long distance provider without dialing any 
extra digits.39  This allowed MCI and Sprint 
to access the residential market.  Also, 
another way in which new entrants 
penetrated the long distance market was a 
result of regulatory asymmetry, as they 
circumvented the access charges for local 
service and passed the costs onto the 
consumer.40  These companies were called 
Competitive Access Providers.  This is how 
Metropolitan Fiber Systems (MFS, later 
Worldcom and now a part of MCI/Verizon) 
entered the telecom market.   
 It is clear the changes in competition 
policy did have an effect on market 
structure.  However, the impact is much 
more pronounced in the long distance 
market than in local service.  In the local 
service market, as of 2004, the Bell 
Operating Companies had 68.9 percent of 
the market (as measured by nationwide local 
service revenue).41  For the long distance 
market, residential market shares as of 2005 
were at&t with 18.1percent, Verizon 16.2 
percent, SBC 15.9 percent, MCI 7.7 percent, 
Sprint 6.2 percent, BellSouth 5.9 percent, 
Qwest 5.9 percent, and Other 24.1 percent.42  
However, factoring in the recent mergers of 
AT&T acquiring SBC and BellSouth and 
becoming at&t, along with the MCI/Verizon 
merger the market shares are: at&t 39.9 
percent, Verizon 23.9 percent, Sprint 6.2 
                                                
39 Ibid, 34 
40 Ibid, 37 
41 “Trends in Telephone Service,” FCC report, Feb. 
2007, 8-11 
42 Ibid, 9-10 
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percent, Qwest 5.9 percent and Other 24.1 
percent.  Even factoring in the recent 
mergers, however, the long distance market 
in the US is fairly competitive, especially 
compared to the UK’s fixed line market.  
Similar to the UK, the US also experienced 
a sudden boom in the mobile telephone 
market with the invention of wireless 
technology.  Currently there are four 
nationwide providers in the US wireless 
telephone market: Sprint Nextel, Verizon 
Wireless, T-Mobile and at&t Wireless 
(formerly Cingular Wireless).  The market is 
heavily concentrated among these four with 
a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of 
2706.43  As an HHI above 1800 indicates 
concentration this value allows us to 
conclude the market is not very competitive 
and can be classified as a “tight oligopoly.”  
This is similar to the wireless industry in the 
UK which, as previously mentioned, is also 
controlled by four large firms. 
 Thus, although there has been a 
move toward consolidation in the US 
telephone market, with the former Baby 
Bells condensing into 3 large companies 
(at&t, Verizon and Qwest) there is much 
more competition than prior to deregulation.  
Moreover, there is a very competitive rivalry 
between at&t and Verion, which benefits 
consumers in terms of productive efficiency.  
However, the concentration in the wireless 
sector is quite high.  As for whether or not 
these changes in competition policy have 
impacted industrial performance, recent data 
seems to indicate it has and the effect has 
been positive.  Post-deregulation 
productivity in the industry has increased, 
and evidence from the recent mergers 
suggests that both at&t and Verizon are 
doing quite well financially.44  In addition, 
                                                
43 “Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive 
Market Condition with Respect to Commercial 
Mobile SServices,” FCC Report 06-142 
44 “AT&T to buy BellSouth,” CNET News, 5 March 
2006. <http://news.com.com/AT38T +to+ 
the US Communications industry is also a 
leader in research and development which 
suggests these companies are employing 
innovation in order to successfully 
compete.45  Overall, it is very clear the end 
of regulation, and recently of price caps, 
gave these telecom companies the ability to 
compete with one another which has 
resulted not only in technological 
advancements in the industry but also with 
increased consumer choice.   
 
IX. The US: Railways 
  
The history of the railway industry 
under regulation is quite similar to the 
airlines in the US.  Unlike the state-owned 
British railroads during regulation, the US 
system consisted of a series of regulations 
and constraints placed on private railways.  
Historically, US rail regulation transpired 
because there was “too much” competition 
in the industry.  Railways did not like 
competing with each other, and shippers 
favored stable, known rates over competitive 
ones.46  Regulation began in 1887 with the 
Interstate Commerce Act, which created the 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to 
oversee railway regulation, setting 
“reasonable and just rates” and enforcing 
rebates as unlawful.47  Subsequent railway 
regulatory legislation ensued, but the basic 
aim of those was simply to reinforce the 
basic tenants of the initial Act.  During 
World War I the government took regulation 
a step further and nationalized the railroads, 
but this was soon reversed after the war 
                                                                       
buy+BellSouth+for+67+billion/2100-1037_3-
6046081.html> 
45 “International Trends in R+D,” Science and 
Engineering Indicators 2004, 
<http://www.nsf.gov/statistics /seind04/c6/c6s3.htm> 
46 Thompson, Louis S. “Regulatory Developments in 
the US: History and Philosophy,” March 2000.  
 <http://www.worldbank.org/transport/rail/re
g_note.pdf> 
47 Ibid, 22-27 
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ended.  During the mid to late 20th century 
the railway industry suffered large declines 
in both its passenger and freight businesses 
due to decreased demand for railway travel.  
By the 1970s financial troubles plagued the 
railway industry, and the railways were 
losing over 300 million a year, threatening 
the viability of the entire industry.48  In 1970 
the government took action and combined 
several passenger railroads in order to create 
the National Railroad Passenger Corporation 
(AMTRAK) to provide intercity passenger 
rail service.  AMTRAK was operated by the 
government as a “for profit” company that 
was free from all regulation.  Also in 1970 
Penn Central, the largest railroad on the east 
coast, declared bankruptcy.  In response the 
government first attempted to bail it out with 
subsidies.  After that failed, however, the 
government nationalized the railroad, 
renaming it Conrail.  These 1970s 
developments set the stage for railroad 
deregulation and eventual financial 
revitalization. 
 Deregulation began with the creation 
of AMTRAK because it was able to operate 
without any regulatory constraints, even 
though it was a quasi-governmental 
organization.  The process was completed 
under the Staggers Act of 1980, which 
eliminated the pricing, exit and operations 
constraints that existed under regulation.49  
In 1987 Conrail was privatized and public 
shares sold.  The effects of deregulation on 
market structure are pretty clear.  
Privatization has led to further consolidation 
in the railroad industry.  In 1982 there were 
32 Class I railroads, by 1999 this had 
decreased to six in the US and two in 
Canada, and currently in 2007 there are only 
five in the US along with the two Canadian 
railroads.50  These are CSX Transportation, 
                                                
48 Ibid, 33 
49 Ibid, 35-38 
50 “Class I Railroad Statistics,” Association of 
American Railroads- Policy and Economics 
Norfolk Southern Railway (Eastern 
railroads), Union Pacific Railway, BNSF 
Railway (Western railroads) and Kansas 
City Southern Rail.  In Canada the two 
remaining railroads are Canadian National 
Railway and Canadian Pacific Railway.  
Most recently the government has 
strengthened the antitrust laws regarding 
railway mergers.  In 2000 when Union 
Pacific wanted to merge with Canadian 
National to form the largest North American 
railway the Surface Transportation Board 
(STB) put a fifteen month moratorium on 
railway mergers, effectively killing the 
merger.  Although the moratorium was 
eventually lifted the STB increased the 
burden on railways seeking to merge by 
requiring they show more definitively how 
the proposed merger would be in the public 
interest.  Although there has been a trend 
toward consolidation in the railroad 
industry, a study by Denis A. Breen 
concludes that mergers have increased 
competition due to labor and operating cost 
savings along with lower average rail rates.51  
This conclusion is based on his work 
analyzing the 1996 merger of Union Pacific 
and Southern Pacific Railways.  This lends 
support to the conclusion that the US 
railway industry, in terms of freight (Class I 
railroads) is much more competitive post-
deregulation. In contrast, however, 
AMTRACK (the intercity passenger railway 
system) is still a quasi-governmental 
organization and does not face any domestic 
passenger rail competition. 
 In addition, the changes in 
competition policy have also had a large 
impact on the performance of the rail 
industry in recent years.  Louis Thompson’s 
                                                                       
Department, 2005. 
<http://www.aar.org/PubCommon/Documents/About
TheIndustry/Statistics.pdf> 
51 Breen, Denis A, “The Union Pacific/Southern 
Pacific Rail Merger: A Retrospective on Merger 
Benefits” Review of Network Economics Vol. 
3, Issue 3-September 2004, 284 
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(2000) study on regulation in the US shows 
evidence that every year since deregulation 
average freight rates have fallen.  In 
addition, a study by Wesley Wilson (1998) 
supported this by showing that deregulation 
had significantly lowered rates for almost all 
commodities.  He also concluded that 
productivity advances have “dominated” the 
industry post-deregulation.52  Further 
evidence of the industry being more 
productive after the end of regulation is 
Conrail, as a private company, being able to 
make the reforms necessary to improve their 
company and profit.  In sum, railways are 
certainly better off from an industrial 
performance standpoint post-deregulation.  
Moreover, the industry appears to be 
competitive as well and the recent mergers 
have been good for consumer welfare.   
 Although there were many 
differences in the UK and the US’s 
individual approaches to railway 
deregulation, the most significant was the 
UK separating the infrastructure from the 
train operating companies. In the US the 
railway companies themselves own the 
track.  This difference led to significant 
infrastructure problems in the UK resulting 
in poor service and train delays that were not 
seen in the US post-deregulation.  
Furthermore, the outcome from deregulation 
in both countries also turned out to be quite 
different.  Currently, the infrastructure and 
maintenance of the rail track in the UK is 
under control of Network rail a government-
operated, “private” company.  In contrast, in 
the US each railway is individually 
responsible for maintaining the 
infrastructure for their trains.  Thus it is 
important to draw the distinction between 
where the competition lies in the UK 
railway industry, as it is only between the 
                                                
52 Wilson, Wesley W., Market Specific Effects of 
Rail Deregulation,” Journal of Industrial Economics 
Vol. XLII, No 1. (March 1994) 
 
passenger and freight operating companies.  
Moreover, in the US the competition in the 
industry is much clearer with individual 
freight railways as well as continued 
regulation with the government-control of 
AMTRAK.   
 
X. The US: Coal 
  
Unlike every other industry 
examined in this paper, the coal industry in 
the US has never been under government 
control or regulation.  The early history of 
coal in the US dates back to the 19th century 
where the industry was composed of small 
coal mining operations with a few skilled 
miners and unskilled assistants.  After the 
Civil War with the beginning of railroad 
construction the coal industry boomed and 
helped fuel the industrial revolution.  At the 
turn of the 19th century the industry 
consisted of “cutthroat competition” 
between firms.53  One interesting aspect of 
the coal industry’s history is that during the 
Great Depression there was a unique 
Supreme Court decision handed down that 
allowed Appalachian coal companies to 
collude because the industry was struggling 
so much due to the depression.54  That 
incident aside, most of the US coal 
industry’s history is marked by competition 
and continued production.  During the 
1960s, however, the coal industry began to 
change greatly with the market structure 
moving toward large, diversified firms and 
away from the small independent 
companies.  After the 1970s energy crisis, 
the coal producers were hit hard by falling 
prices in the late 1970s and many small, 
inefficient producers left the market.  More 
                                                
53 “US Coal Industry in the 19th Century,” Eh.Net 
Encyclopedia. <http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article 
/adams.industry.coal.us> 
54 Appalachian Coals Inc, et al v. United States, 288 
US 344, http://www.stolaf.edu/people 
/becker/antitrust/summaries/288us344.html 
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recently, in the 1980s and 1990s there has 
been an increase in the size of the average 
coal mine and a decrease in the number of 
mines nationwide.  Also, this is coupled 
with an increase in size of the average coal 
producer and the presence of more foreign-
owned companies in the industry.55   
 As suggested above, the trend in the 
US coal industry has been towards larger 
firms operating larger coal mines.  During 
the last two decades there has been 
increased competition between the three 
coal operating regions left in the US (Ohio 
River, Wyoming and West Virginia).  The 
industry has also faced competition from 
overseas producers, but not to the same 
extent that UK coal companies do.  
Moreover, compared to other US industries 
coal mining is not very concentrated at all.  
In 1976 the largest four coal mining 
producers, Peabody Coal, Consolidation 
Coal, AMAX and Island Creek, produced 25 
percent of the coal mined in the US, while 
the largest eight produced only 34 percent.  
Similarly, in 1986 the largest four, Peabody 
Coal, Consolidation Coal, AMAX and 
Texas utilities, produced only 20 percent 
and the top eight 30 percent.  The trend 
continues into the 1990s, in 1991 the largest 
four producers, Peabody Coal, 
Consolidation Coal, AMAX and ARCO, 
produced 22 percent and the top eight 33 
percent.56  It is a very interesting conclusion, 
although perhaps not surprising, that the 
most competitive industry looked at in this 
paper is the US coal industry which was 
never regulated or nationalized.  
 
XI. Conclusion 
                                                
55 Ward, Ken Jr.,“Coal industry competition made 
mines bigger,” Sunday Gazette-Mail, 6 June 
1999,<http://wvgazette.com/static/series/mining/coal
0606.html> 
56  DOE Report, “The Changing Structure of the US 
Coal Industry,” 1993 
 
  
As ascertained from the discussion 
above, there are many similarities and 
differences in the UK’s and US’s 
approaches to changing competition 
policies.  Despite these noted contrasts, 
however, the overall outcome of improved 
industrial performance occurred across the 
board.  These competition policies consisted 
of either deregulating an industry from 
constraints and controls, as was seen most 
often in the US.  Or, in contrast, privatizing 
a nationalized firm that dominated a certain 
industry, which was primarily the case in the 
UK.  For the airline industry the UK’s 
change in competition policy was the 
privatization of BA.  This action led to an 
increase in competition and a better long-
term cost performance for BA.  In the US, 
however, the airlines, which were always 
privately owned, were simply deregulated 
by the government.  Similarly, this action 
led to more competition in the industry, 
particularly on different flight routes, as well 
as a decrease in fares and more efficient use 
of resources.   
 As for the telecommunications 
industry, the UK changed the competition 
policy in that industry by privatizing the 
dominant, state-owned firm British 
Telecom.  This resulted in the rise of other 
telecom firms in the UK along with an 
increase in labor productivity and a more 
efficient use of resources.  In contrast, in the 
US, the government broke up the natural 
local telephone monopoly AT&T into seven 
smaller companies in an attempt to inject 
competition into the market.  This change in 
competition policy, followed by even more 
deregulation, led to new entrants in the 
industry and resulted in increased 
productivity and higher levels of research 
and development spending spending.    
 As for the railway industry, in the 
UK the state-owned British Rail was 
privatized and split into many different train 
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operating companies.  In addition, unlike the 
US, the UK also privatized the railway 
infrastructure which was controlled by a 
separate company.  This privatization 
approach had severe problems leading to the 
financial collapse of the infrastructure 
company resulting in the government 
regaining control of that company.  
Bankruptcy and re-nationalization aside, 
competition among the train operating 
companies was created post-privatization.  
Moreover, there have also been industrial 
performance gains, including higher 
passenger levels post-privatization, along 
with an improved financial performance of 
Network Rail over the past few years.  In the 
US, however, changes in competition policy 
took the form of the government 
deregulating the railway industry.  This led 
to much more competition among freight 
operators in the US, but not for passenger 
rail transportation, as there is still only one 
operator: government-run AMTRAK.  
Deregulation in the US was linked to 
industrial productivity gains in the form of 
lower freight rates for almost all 
commodities.   
 As for the coal industry, in the UK 
the dominant firm (UK Coal) was 
privatized.  Although there continues to be 
one large firm dominating UK coal mining, 
the company does face serious competition 
from imported coal.  As a result of both 
privatization and import competition, there 
have been labor productivity increases in the 
industry.  The US, in contrast, never 
nationalized or regulated the coal industry.  
In fact, it has been historically, and is still 
today, a competitive industry.  The US coal 
industry, compared to the other three 
industries studied, has the most competitive 
market structure. 
 In sum, although both countries changed 
their competition policies, they did so in very 
different ways.  The UK generally privatized 
their large, state-run industries, whereas the US 
primarily lifted the regulations present on 
private firms.  However, the interesting thing to 
note here is that although differing degrees of 
competition emerged in the two countries, both 
saw significant gains in industrial performance 
emerge as a result of privatization or 
deregulation.  This study indicates that positive 
industrial performance can be accrued simply 
through privatization and that injecting effective 
competition is not necessarily essential for such 
gains to be made. 
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